Appointment of Imam Ali (A.S.): Explicit or Implicit?
1. Introduction
We have gathered [1] here tonight in memory of the person who has given us our
identity as "Shi'a Muslims". We take pride in calling ourselves
"Shi'as of 'Ali" - the Partisans or Followers of 'Ali bin Abi Talib
(a.s.).
Tonight I am going to talk on the caliphate of Imam 'Ali bin Abi Talib because
of questions asked by many people about the recent controversy on "the
explicit appointment" of the Imam to the position of caliphate versus
"the implicit appointment". Not only adults, but also youths have
approached me with this question; and it is my duty to ensure that the beliefs
of our youths in the imamate and caliphate of Amir al-Mu'min?n stays firm
without any shadow of doubt.
The controversy started regarding the statement of a learned Shi'a scholar
published in the Bio Ethics Encyclopaedia under the entry of "Islam"
in which he writes:
"Muhammad died in 632 C.E., having brought the whole of Arabia under the Medina government. However, he had left no explicit instructions regarding succession to
his religious-political authority."[2]
Initially, when I was given a copy of the article, I did not think much of it
because I realized that it was a paper written for a very wide audience.
(Although ideally the issue of succession should not have been mentioned in
that article at all, its deletion would not have harmed the main body of the
article.) However, the response of the learned writer to the questions sent to
him via internet by some Shi'as from the U.K. became a matter of concern for
me. He responded as follows:
"On the question whether there was no EXPLICIT instruction regarding
succession to the Prophet's 'religious-political authority' let it be clear
that the statement while asserting that there were no EXPLICIT (that is,
distinctly expressed, clearly stated, not merely implied) instruction in the
matter of succession to the 'Prophet's religious-political authority,' it
asserts by implication that there was an IMPLICIT (that is, necessarily
involved though not plainly expressed) direction in the matter. This implicit
direction of the Prophet was expressed on several occasions in his lifetime,
including finally at al-Ghadir.
"It was also because of this absence of explicit statement on these
occasions that Imam 'Ali never used any of these occasions, including
al-Ghadir, to put forward his candidacy as the only rightful successor of the
Prophet."[3]
After the 21st of Ramadhan 1418, the learned scholar issued another statement
in which he reaffirmed his belief in the absence of the explicit appointment of
Imam 'Ali by writing:
"The foundation of our faith, that is the Shi'a faith, is based on this
IMPLICIT sense. Historically (the only position that can be taken in the
article here) the source of dissension in the early community was the absence
of EXPLICIT directions regarding the succession in the community."
"The statement of the wilaya (man kuntu mawla[hu] fa hadha 'Aliyyun
mawla[hu]), which is the documentation for the Shi'a acclamation in support of
the Imamate of Imam 'Ali, is regarded as an implicit rather than explicit
statement of the Prophet regarding the 'succession of his comprehensive
authority.' The reason is that the word mawla in Arabic is ambiguous as far as
the 'succession' itself is concerned."[4]
2. The Explicit vs. Implicit
First let us see whether or not this division of appointment of caliphate into
"implicit" and "explicit" has any historical precedence in
the history of Islamic theology. For the sake of time restraint, let me just
state the following historical facts:
1. On the issue of caliphate, the Muslims have different views. The Sunni
Muslims do not believe that the Prophet appointed anyone as his successor,
neither explicitly nor implicitly; and that it was left for the community to
choose whomsoever they wanted. The Shi'as, on the other hand, believes that the
Prophet appointed 'Ali bin Abi Talib as the caliph and successor after him.
2. All the Shi'a sects (i.e., the Imamiyya/Ithna-'Ashariyya and both the existing
Isma'iliyya groups: the Bohras and the Agha Khanis) believe that the Prophet of
Islam explicitly appointed Imam 'Ali on many occasions as his caliph and
successor.
3. The Zaydiyya sect has a belief different from the Sunnis as well as the
Shi'as. Although they believe that 'Ali was the best and the most qualified for
caliphate, they still accept Abu Bakr and 'Umar ibn al-Khattab as the first and
the second successors of the Prophet respectfully; but they do not accept
'Uthman bin 'Affan as the third caliph.
4. Historically speaking, it is the Jarûdiyya sub-sect of the Zaydiyya that
believed that the Prophet had appointed Imam 'Ali not by naming him but by just
describing his qualities: "nassa bi 'l-wasf dûna 't-tasmiyya - he [the
Prophet] appointed by the description without naming [the person]."[5]
It is from this belief that the nass (the directive for appointment) is divided
into "an-nass al-jali-the clear/explicit directive" and "an-nass
al-khafi-the hidden/implicit directive".
But the Shi'a Imamiyya Ithna-'Ashariyya have never subscribed to the idea that
"the foundation of our faith is based on this implicit sense." They
have believed all along that the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) on several
occasions, very clearly and very openly appointed 'Ali bin Abi Talib as his
successor, caliph and Imam of the Muslims after him.[6] Only when the Shi'a
Imamiyya theologians were in debate against their opponents (including the
Zaydiyya), they used the term "an-nass al-jali" on the principle of
dealing with the opponent on his own terms.[7]
So historically speaking, no Shi'a Imamiyya theologian has treaded exclusively
the path of implicit or implied appointment of Amiru 'l-Mu'minin 'Ali bin Abi
Talib (a.s.) as "the foundation of our faith" and none of them have
taken the hadith of Ghadir as an implicit appointment.
5. Why did the Zaydiyya insist on the implicitness of the appointment of 'Ali
to caliphate? Since some of their sub-sects had accepted the caliphate of Abu
Bakr and 'Umar, believing in the explicit statements of the Prophet appointing
'Ali would portray those two caliphs in a very negative light-it would mean
that they knowingly opposed the explicit statements of the Prophet! So in order
to safeguard the prestige of the first two caliphs, the appointment of 'Ali was
shrouded in ambiguity by saying that it was not explicit but only implied. And
since it was not explicit, the caliphs could not be blamed for usurping the
caliphate from Amiru 'l-Mu'minin 'Ali!
This shows the serious implications of believing that the appointment of 'Ali
was only implicit; it would mean that the blame of whatever happened after the
Prophet's death on the issue of succession is to be placed on the Prophet
himself, and not on the caliphs. It would mean that the first two caliphs are not
to be blamed for usurping the caliphate from Imam 'Ali because they were doing
what they thought, in the absence of any explicit instruction, was the best for
Islam.
So when the objections of the Shi'a community against the learned scholar
increased, in the last days of Ramadhan 1418, he issued a general circular
addressed to the Shi'as via the Internet:
"I am taking this opportunity to state in the most ABSOLUTE terms that not
only do I believe in the unequivocal authenticity of the event of al-Ghadir which
took place on the 18th of Dhul-Hijja, 11AH/632 CE; I believe that the statement
by the Prophet 'Everyone whose master I am, also has 'Ali as a master,' to be
the explicit designation of the Imam 'Ali to the office of the Leadership of
the Muslim Community, as upheld by the Twelver Shi'a faith."[8]
3. The First Explicit
Appointment
Islam began when the Prophet became 40 years old. Initially, the mission was
kept a secret. Then three years after the advent of Islam, the Prophet was
ordered to commence the open declaration of his message. This was the occasion
when Almighty Allah revealed the verse "And warn thy nearest
relations." (26:214)
When this verse was revealed, the Prophet organized a feast which is known as
"the Feast of the Clan" (da'wat dhi 'l-'ashira). This is the first
time that the Prophet openly and publicly called the relations to accept him as
the Messenger and Prophet of Allah. It is also the same feast in which the
Prophet declared 'Ali bin Abi Talib very openly, very clearly, and very explicitly
as his successor and caliph. I will just summarize what the Prophet said:
O Sons of 'Abdu 'l-Muttalib! By Allah, I do not know of any person among the
Arabs who has come to his people with better than what I have brought to you. I
have brought to you the good of this world and the next, and I have been
commanded by the Lord to call you unto Him. Therefore, who amongst you will
support me in this matter so that he may be my brother (akhi), my successor
(wasiyyi) and my caliph (khalifati)?
The Prophet (s.a.w.) used the words "my brother, my successor, my
caliph". This is as explicit as it can get in the very first call to
Islam! No one answered except 'Ali bin Abi Talib who was only around fifteen
years old at that time. The Prophet called 'Ali closer to himself, patted his
neck, and said:
"Verily this is my brother, my successor, and my caliph amongst you.
Therefore, listen to him and obey."[9]
This is very explicit because the audience understand the appointment of 'Ali
very clearly. Some of them, including Abu Lahab, even joked with Abu Talib that
your nephew, Muhammad, has ordered you to listen to and obey your own son! At
the least, this shows that the appointment was clear and explicit, not just
implied.
The greatest proof of the explicit nature of this appointment at the very early
stage of Prophet Muhammad's mission is the attempt by Sunni writers to conceal
the words used by the Prophet. For example, the famous Muslim historian, Ibn
Jarir at-Tabari (d. 310 AH), has recorded this incident with the crucial words
intact in his Ta'rikhu 'l-Umam wa 'l-Mulûk. The 1879 edition of his Ta'rikh,
published in Leiden (Netherlands) has the words: "...this is my brother,
my successor and my caliph..." But when it came to at-Tabari's Tafsir,
while commenting on the verse 26:214, at-Tabari himself or the editors have
changed the words as follows: "...this is my brother and
so-and-so..."
All these attempts to delete the whole incident from the pages of history or
change the crucial words "my successor and my caliph" into
"so-and-so" clearly shows that those terms were very explicit in
supporting the appointment of Imam 'Ali as the successor of the Prophet. If it
had been otherwise, then there was no need on the part of our opponents to hide
or change these words.
4. Abu Sufyan Knew But Others
Didn't?
Insisting on the implicitness of the appointment of 'Ali safeguards the
prestige of the first two caliphs. Instead of looking for the truth and then
judging the people, they want to twist the truth to safeguard the positions of
the people.
It is difficult to believe that the companions of the Prophet did not hear him
appointing 'Ali on so many different occasions; and knowing that they were
Arabic speaking Qurayshi, it is unacceptable to think that they did not clearly
understand the appointment. One way of knowing this is to go to an interesting
turn of event that took place after the Prophet's death.
When 'Ali and the Banu Hashim were busy in the funeral rites of the Prophet, a
person comes to their door and offers his help for caliphate. That person was
Abu Sufyan. Yes, Abu Sufyan, the archenemy of the Prophet who fought many
battles against Islam and Muslims, and only surrendered when he could no longer
fight the Muslims. He surrendered just a couple of years before the Prophet's
death.
He comes to 'Ali's house and recites a poem in the praise of the Prophet's
family. Then he said: "O Banu Hashim! O Banu 'Abd Manaf! Will you accept
that Abu Fasal...rules over you? By Allah! If you wish, I can fill it [i.e.,
the city of Medina] with horses and soldiers."
'Ali bin Abi Talib knew that Abu Sufyan was not sincere, that he was just
trying to take advantage of the conflict on the issue of succession after the
Prophet. Abu Sufyan wanted Banu Hashim and the group of Abu Bakr/'Umar to fight
one another and weaken one another so that Banu Umayya could take advantage of
the situation and gain its lost supremacy over the Arabs. And so Imam 'Ali
replied: "Go away, O Abu Sufyan! By Allah you do not mean what you are
saying! You have always been deceiving Islam and its people; and we are busy
with [the funeral of] the Messenger of Allah (s.a.w.). And [as for those who
are conspiring for caliphate], each person is responsible for what he
does."[10]
It is indeed unbelievable that Abu Sufyan, with his background, knew that 'Ali
had the right to caliphate while the other 'great' companions did not know or
did not understand the Prophet clearly.
It seems that Abu Sufyan further tried to incite 'Ali to take up arms for his
right of caliphate. At that time, 'Ali responded by saying: "If I speak
[for my right], they say, 'He is hungry for power.' And if I keep quiet, they
say, 'He fears death.' No, not at all; after all that chaos. By Allah, this son
of Abu Talib is more at ease with death than an infant is at its mother's
breast!"[11]
5. Why Didn't 'Ali Use These
Arguments?
Did Imam 'Ali not use the arguments of Da'wat dhi 'l-'Ashira or Ghadir soon
after the Prophet's death because they were just implicit statements? The
learned Shi'a scholar wrote: "It is also because of this absence of
explicit statement on these occasions that Imam 'Ali never used any of these
occasions, including al-Ghadir, to put forward his candidacy as the only
rightful successor of the Prophet."[12] This is indeed a novel way of
looking at the conflict of caliphate. The Sunni opponent would just extend this
view a little bit further and say that 'Ali did not use these arguments because
there was no argument at all.
In order to understand why 'Ali did not use the arguments at that particular
time, we have to understand the circumstances, the opponents, and the
consequences of the actions of Imam 'Ali (a.s.).
The Circumstances:
When the Prophet passed away from this world, there were different kinds of
people among the Muslim community.
First there were the so-called fifth columnists among the Muslims who were
waiting for a civil war so as to put an end to Islam and gain power over the
Arabs. Abu Sufyan and his clan represented this group. They were neither in
Saqifa nor with 'Ali bin Abi Talib. The Qur'an also talks about the presence of
hypocrites among the Muslims. (See 9:97.) Then there was Musaylima al-Kadhdhab
and Sajjah bint al-Harath both claimed prophethood and had gained some
following among the Bedouins.
After surveying the circumstances, what could 'Ali have done?
Let me give you an example to illustrate the decision of Imam 'Ali. During the
caliphate of 'Umar, there is a story of an infant who was being claimed by two
women as their baby. The decision was forwarded to Imam 'Ali. When the Imam
found both women insisting on their claim, he ordered that the infant be cut
into two, and each woman be given one half. What was the reaction of the real
mother and the fake mother? The fake mother decided to go along with the decision
even if it meant cutting the baby into two halves whereas the real mother
announced her readiness to give up the child.
Islam is the baby in our discussion; the usurpers would do anything to keep the
power even if it meant endangering the survival of Islam itself. 'Ali, on the
other hand, as the true custodian of Islam, was prepared to relinquish the
power for sake of saving Islam from total destruction. That is why Imam 'Ali
did not resort to the sword or allow Abu Sufyan and others to incite him into
armed opposition. He accepted deprivation of his personal right of caliphate
over the destruction of Islam.
He accepted deprivation but did not stop from protesting whenever and wherever
the chance availed itself for him. When he was deprived again after 'Umar's
death, he addressed the Consultative Committee who had chosen 'Uthman and said,
"You have certainly known that I am the most rightful of all others for
the caliphate. By Allah, so long as the affairs of the Muslims remain intact
and there is no oppression in it save on myself, I shall be quiet..."[13]
The Opponents:
As for the opponents, they were not ready to listen to any word of reason. When
you know that your opponents are not opposing you because of ignorance, and
that they are ready even to kill you-there is no sense in mentioning all the
proofs right there and then. You may wonder why I am saying this.
You recall that in the Da'wat dhi 'l-'Ashira, the Prophet had used three words
for Imam 'Ali: "my brother, my successor, and my caliph." The last
two terms were very crucial for the claim of 'Ali to caliphate. The first one
"my brother" was not that forceful or threatening to the opponents.
That is why even when the Sunni writers started concealing the hadith of the
Prophet, they left the words "my brother" intact but they replaced
the words "my successor, my caliph" with the words
"so-and-so".
Now to understand the attitude and obstinacy of the opponents of 'Ali, let us
see just one part of the heated exchange of words between Imam 'Ali (a.s.) and
'Umar ibn al-Khattab during those early days of caliphate.
I will just summarize what happened before the actual conversation: After 'Umar
and his group imposed Abu Bakr over the Ansar (the inhabitants of Medina) at
Saqifa, they came to the Prophet's Mosque and declared that Abu Bakr has been
chosen as the caliph so all should come and pledge allegiance to him.
Then they were informed that 'Ali, other members of Banu Hashim and some
prominent companions of the Prophet had gathered in the house of Fatima, refusing to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr sent messages but nobody came
to pledge allegiance (bay'at). Then 'Umar came with his people and even put
firewood at the door to burn the house down if no one came out! They finally
forced the door open, injuring Fatima in the process, and forcefully brought
all people to the Mosque to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr.
Imam 'Ali was also arrested and brought to the Mosque. There was an exchange of
words between the Imam and Abu Bakr in which the Imam used only the argument
used by the Quraysh (Makkans) against the Ansar. The Quraysh had gained the
upper hand over the Ansar by saying that the Prophet was from their tribe,
therefore, they have more right to the caliphate; Imam 'Ali extended that line
of argument and said that we are from the family of the Prophet, therefore, we
have more right to the caliphate than you.[14]
Ibn Qutayba ad-Dinwari, a Sunni historian of caliphate, continues the
narration:
They said to 'Ali: "Pledge allegiance!"
'Ali said: "If I do not do, then what?"
They said: "Then, by Allah besides whom there
is no god, we shall chop off your neck!"
'Ali said: "Then you would be killing a servant
of Allah and the brother of His Messenger!"
'Umar said: "As for being a servant of Allah, yes;
as for being the brother of His Messenger, no![15]
What does this statement of 'Umar say? Out of the three things that the Prophet
had mentioned about Imam 'Ali, the least threatening was "my
brother," but during those days, 'Umar was not even prepared to accept
'Ali as "the brother of the Prophet"! Now you tell me why 'Ali did
not say, "I am also the Prophet's successor and caliph"?
Ibn Qutaybah goes on with his narration: While this conversation between Imam
'Ali and 'Umar was going on, "Abu Bakr was silent, not saying anything.
Then 'Umar turned to him and said, 'Why don't you issue your order concerning
him?' Abu Bakr said, 'I do not wish to impose anything on him as long as Fatima is by his side.'"
Yes, it was Fatima who protected the life of 'Ali during those bleak days of
the Muslim history. 'Ali leaves the oppressive atmosphere, goes to the
Prophet's grave and complains by addressing the Prophet: "O son of my
mother! The people oppressed me and had almost killed me." These are the
same words Harun used to complain about the Israelites when Prophet Musa came
back with the Tawrat. (See 7:150) Remember that the Prophet of Islam himself
had said, "O 'Ali, you are to me like Harun was to Musa; except that there
is no prophet after me."[16]
6. Didn't 'Ali Ever Use These
Arguments?
'Ali did not use the arguments during the early days of caliphate for two
reasons: 1. for the sake of Islam's well-being and survival; 2. because of the
obstinacy of his opponents. It had nothing to do with the implicit vs. explicit
nature of appointment. The truth is that whenever the opportunity availed
itself, Imam 'Ali always talked about his right to the caliphate of the
Prophet.
No one can blame 'Ali for making the claim or presenting its proof at a later
date. He himself said, "No person is to be blamed for delay in (securing)
his own right but the blame lies on him who takes what he is not entitled
to."[17]
In the year 35 AH, while the Imam was in Kufa, he heard that some people
doubted his claim of precedence over the previous three caliphs. Therefore, he
came to the gathering at the mosque and implored the eyewitnesses of the event
of Ghadir Khumm to verify the truth of the Prophet's declaration about his
being "the mawla" (master, leader, lord) of those whose master was
the Prophet himself. In most sources, we have the names of twenty four
companions of the Prophet who testified to the truth of Imam 'Ali's claim.
Other sources like Musnad of Ibn Hanbal and Majma'u 'z-Zawa'id of al-Haythami
put that number at thirty.[18]
One should bear in mind that this incident took place 25 years after the event
of Ghadir Khumm, and during that period hundreds of eyewitnesses had died
naturally or in the battles fought during that time. Add to this the fact that
this incident took place in Kufa which was far from Medina, the center of the
companions.
* * *
Notes:
[1] This section is based on the notes of two lectures in memory
of Imam 'Ali bin Abu Talib (a.s.) given at Ja'fari Islamic Centre, Toronto, on the eve of 19th and 21st Ramadhan, 1418 (1998).
[2] Abdulaziz Sachedina, "Islam," The Bio Ethics Encyclopaedia, vol.
3 (1995) p. 1289.
[3] See the response of Dr. Sachedina widely distributed on the inter-net among
the Shi'as.
[4] See Sachedina's circular addressed to "All the Followers of the Ahlul-Bayt".
[5] See 'Allama al-Hilli, Manahiju 'l-Yaqin, ed. M.R. al-Ansari (Qum, 1416) p. 306; al-Mufid, Awa'ilu 'l-Maqalat, p. 41-42. After 'Ali, the Zaydiyya believe
in Hasan and Husayn, and then in Zayd bin 'Ali. After Zayd, any descendant of
'Ali and Fatima who does jihad against the tyrants, is pious and is learned in
religion can become their Imam.
[6] See an-Nawbakhti (circ. 3rd century AH), Firaqu 'sh-Shi'a (Beirut, 1984) p. 19. This book is actually a summarized version of Maqalatu 'l-Imamiyya of
Sa'd bin 'Abdullah al-Ash'ari al-Qummi and has been erroneously attributed to
an-Nawbakhti. See S.M. Riza al-Husayni al-Jalali, "'Firaqu 'sh-Shi'a' aw
'Maqalatu 'l-Imamiyya' li 'n-Nawbakhti am li 'l-'Ashari?" in the first
issue of Turathun?, (Qum: Mu'assasa Ali 'l-Bayt, 1405) pp. 29-49.
[7] See, for example, one of the most famous books of Shi'a theology, Kashfu
'l-Murad, the commentary (sharh) of 'Allamah al-Hilli on Muhaqqiq at-Tusi's
Tajridu 'l-I'tiqadat, tr. Abu 'l-Hasan Sha'rani (Tehran: Islamiyya, n.d.) p.
516-518. In Usûlu 'l-Fiqh, the term "an-nass" means a statement whose
meaning is very clear and specific. In this sense, an-nass, by definition,
cannot be implicit or ambiguous, and so it cannot be divided into jali and
khafi.
[8] Issued in late Ramadhan or early Shawwal 1418 on the internet.
[9] For more on this event, see the chapter, "Self-Censorship in Muslim
History" above.
[10] Al-Mufid, al-Irshad, p. 190; al-Ya'qûbi, at-Ta'rikh, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar
Sadir) p. 126; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, Tadhkiratu Khawassi 'l-Umma, p. 121; Ibn
'Abdi Rabbih, al-'Iqdu 'l-Farid, vol. 4 (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1983)
p. 257; al-Qadi 'Abdu 'l-Jabbar, al-Mughni fi 't-Tawhid wa 'l-'Adl, vol. 2
(Cairo: Dar al-Misriyya li 't-Ta'lif) p. 121; Ibn Abi 'l-Hadid, Sharh Nahji
'l-Balagha, vol. 6 (Cairo: Dar Ihya Kutubi 'l-'Arabiya, 1959) p. 17.
[11] See Nahju 'l-Balagha, sermon no. 5.
[12] See the quotation in the first part of this chapter.
[13] Nahju 'l-Balagha, sermon # 74; see also at-Tabari in his Ta'rikh and Ibn
al-Athar in his al-Kamil in the events of 23 AH; al-Azhari, Tahzibu 'l-Lugha,
vol. 1 (Cairo edition) p. 341.
[14] What I have written above cannot even be considered as a summary of the
events of Saqifa and its aftermath. For details of the events in English, based
on the earliest sources of Muslim history, see Rizvi, Imamate, pp. 113-126;
al-'Askari, S. Murtaza, 'Abdu'l-lah ibn Sab?' and Other Myths (Tehran: Wofis,
1984) pp. 69-95; Jafri, The Origin & Early Development, pp. 27-53.
[15] For the conversation mentioned here, see Ibn Qutaybah ad-Dinwari,
al-Imamah wa 's-Siyasah, part 1 (Cairo: al-Halabi Publications, n.d.) p. 20.
Ibn Qutaybah's own words are as follows:
[16] Imam al-Bukhari has quoted this in two places in his Sahih, once in a
brief form (without "except there is no prophet after me") and then
in full. See Sahih, vol. 5, Arabic with English translation by M. Mohsin Khan (Beirut: Dar al-'Arabiyya, n.d.) p. 47, 492-493.
[17] Nahju 'l-Balagha, saying # 166.
[18] This incident of Kufa has been narrated by four companions of the Prophet
and fourteen of their disciples, and has been recorded in most books of history
and tradition. See al-Amini, al-Ghadir, vol. 1 (Tehran: Mu'assatu 'l-Muwahidi,
1976) pp. 166-186.